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Creating a framework for a Single European 
Sky—The opportunity cost of reorganising 
European airspace 
  Niall Neligan* B.L.  
The object of this article is to critically evaluate the legal framework 
for a European Single Sky project in light of the recent European 
Court of Justice decision in International Air Transport Association 
v The Department of Transport. The article will examine in detail 
the framework regulations outlining the major provisions from the 
recommendations of the Commission's High Level Group in 2000, 
to the implementation at a micro-level by national authorities of the 
legislation adopted in 2004. Furthermore, this article will examine 
whether the savings to air service providers from the Single 
European Sky project in the long term will be negated by the short 
term outgoings associated with compensating passengers in the 
event of delays, cancellations and denied boardings caused by non-
systemic factors. 
Introduction 
One of the major objectives of the European project since its 
inception has been the liberalisation of markets, the free movement 
of peoples, goods and services, and the creation of transnational 
regulations aimed at harmonising diverse national interests; nowhere 
is this more evident in recent years than in the area of air transport, 
where the European Commission has taken the initiative in creating 
a framework for a Single European Sky as well as affording greater 
protection for passengers in the event of delayed and cancelled 
flights. 
In the recent decision of International Air Transport Association and 
others v The Department of Transport ,1 the Court of Justice 
confirmed the validity of Community legislation on air passengers' 
rights following the introduction of Regulation 261/2004. The 
Regulation affords passengers greater protection in the event of 
denied boarding, flight cancellation or long delays.2 During the 
course of the case, the IATA and ELFFA argued not unreasonably 
that airlines will be held responsible for delays over which they may 
have no control, such as air traffic congestion, adverse weather and 
industrial action taken at different airports. 
The inevitable cost burden to airlines will no doubt switch focus 
back to the Commission's attempts to reduce delay by creating a 
framework for a Single European Sky.3 The Single European Sky 
project is the much lauded Community initiative to streamline the 
management of European airspace and thus create a more efficient 
system for air navigation.4 
Globalisation of markets, the availability of budget airlines and the 
greater mobility of migrant workers and tourists have placed 
enormous demands on European aviation infrastructure.5 Presently, 
European airspace is the most congested in the world; in the last 
seven years aviation traffic in Europe has grown by 15 per cent, and 
is set to grow further; this has an adverse effect on route traffic 
resulting in delayed flights.6 
There are several reasons why European airspace is so congested; 
historically, individual States have been responsible for air traffic 
management, thus giving rise to a fragmented system based on 
national interest.7 In turn, this has had a knock-on effect on route 
management resulting in inefficient use of available airspace.8 Allied 
to this problem is the need to use airspace for military purposes, 
consequently air-routes have to be managed on an ongoing basis.9 
This inefficient use of airspace has resulted in traffic convergence 
and occasionally gridlock on fixed route networks prolonging flight 
times and causing delay.10 
In 2000, the Commission established a High Level Group to 
examine the possibility of creating a SES network.11 The 
recommendations made in their report became a central plank in the 
Commission's White Paper on Transport.12 The High Level Group 
made a number of recommendations under eight headings, principal 
among which was the establishment of a legal framework for 
bringing about a Single European Sky.13 In order to achieve this 
objective, the group recommended that the EU institutions should 
take the lead in defining high-level rules and ensuring compliance 
across the Member States.14 Furthermore, the group recommended 
improved co-operation between civil and military agencies for the 
development and enforcement of Community regulation and 




Arising out of the recommendations of the High Level Group, a 
follow up communication was issued by the Commission in 2001.16 
The purpose of this communication was to set out an action 
programme in response to the report of the High Level Group; 
defining the objectives and the working methods for the reform of 
air traffic management in Europe. This Communication was 
augmented by a further communication dealing with concrete 
proposals for the specific areas of the action programme.17 The 
proposals were put to the Parliament and the Member States reached 
agreement on them in December 2003.18 
Four separate Regulations entered into force on April 20, 2004: 
〇. • Regulation 549/2004 (“The Framework Regulation”)19 ; 
 . • Regulation 550/2004 (“The Service Provision Regulation”)20 ; 
 . • Regulation 551/2004 (“The Airspace Regulation”)21 ; and 
 . • Regulation 552/2004 (“The Interoperability Regulation”).22  
 
The Framework Regulation 
The Framework Regulation as its name suggests, creates the 
structure for the Single European Sky project with its principal 
objectives being the creation of a more efficient integrated airspace, 
enhanced safety standards and the promotion of overall efficiency 
for general air traffic management.23 One of the criticisms of the 
Framework Regulation, however, is that it proposes a bottom-up 
approach to air traffic management; rather than the creation of a pan-
European system24 . From a political perspective this would appear 
to be the most expedient method for bringing about the Single 
European Sky project, however on a practical level it is cumbersome 
and over dependent on its implementation by the various Member 
States. 
Under the Regulation, Member States are required to either 
nominate or establish national supervisory authorities to assume 
tasks relating to the SES project.25 Those designated national 
authorities shall in accordance with the Regulation be independent 
of air navigation service providers, and exercise their powers in an 
impartial and transparent manner.26 Each Member State is required 
to nominate two representatives to join the Single European Sky 
Committee; the object of which is to assist the Commission in 
pursuing its objectives and to meet the needs and interests of all 
categories of users, both civil and military.27 The committee will be 
consulted by the Commission on an ongoing basis regarding the 
implementation rules and on non-legislative initiatives, and will 
make decisions based on qualified majority voting.28 
To further assist the committee in reaching its decisions, the 
Regulation provides for the establishment of an “industry 
consultation body”.29 The creation of this body was one of the 
central recommendations of the High Level Group, and its role is to 
advise the Commission on the technical aspects of the 
implementation of the Single European Sky.30 
 
Implementing rules 
In order to implement the rules outlined under Art.3 which come 
within the remit of Eurocontrol, the Commission can issue mandates 
to that body setting out the tasks to be performed and the timetable 
for completion. Article 8(3) provides that if Eurocontrol is not in a 
position to accept a mandate, or the Commission concludes that the 
work pursuant to a mandate is unsatisfactory, untimely or inadequate 
then the Commission reserves for itself the power to adopt 
alternative measures to achieve those objectives.31 
Inevitably because the Regulation relies on the designated national 
authorities to implement the SES project, the Regulation provides 
for sanctions against airspace users and service providers which can 
be taken at a domestic level, and those sanctions must be 
proportional and dissuasive.32 However, the implementation of the 
Regulation will be lessened by ongoing consultation at domestic 
level with stakeholders, in theory this should reduce the likelihood 
of sanctions for non-compliance. 
The Regulation would appear to provide two methods for 
communicating with interested stakeholders, one at Community 
level and another locally driven by national authorities; whether this 
development will prove satisfactory in the long term is another 
matter. It is fair to argue that if the object of the SES initiative is to 
create a more efficient use of airspace, the existence of parallel 
bodies is a cause for concern. Inevitably the creation of an additional 
level of bureaucracy may stymie the quick progression and 
implementation of the project. That said; the Regulation has 
provided a mechanism for reviewing performance, drawing upon the 
expertise of Eurocontrol in the examination and evaluation of air 
navigation. 
Article 11(2) provides, inter alia: 
“(A) Allowing the comparison and improvement of air navigation 
service provision; 
(b) Assisting air navigation service providers to deliver the required 
services; 
(c) Improving the consultation process between airspace users, air 
navigation service providers and airports; 
(d) Allowing the identification and the promotion of best practice, 
including improved safety, efficiency and capacity.” 
Article 12 requires national authorities to submit annual reports for 
the purpose of allowing the Commission to review the application of 
the Regulation and in turn report its findings to the Parliament and 
the Council.33 Reports shall contain an evaluation of results achieved 
and provide detailed analysis of developments in the sector in light 
of the original objectives. 
 
 
The Service Provision Regulation 
The principal objective of the Service Provision Regulation 
(Regulation 550/2004) is to ensure that common standards for the 
provision of air navigation services are applied across the EU.34 
Traditionally, air navigation services have been looked after by 
individual Member States, giving rise to disparities in terms of 
organisation, training and equipment.35 At the heart of the SES 
project is the creation of what are known as Functional Airspace 
Blocks (FABs).36 A Functional Airspace Block is an area of which 
comes into being according to operational requirements, reflecting 
the need to ensure more integrated management of airspace 
regardless of existing boundaries.37 Under the SES project, a FAB 
can cover the airspace of a number of Member States; the traditional 
method of operation according to national boundaries will no longer 
be an option, consequently air navigation providers will have to act 
in conjunction, according to common structures and procedures. 
Given that the object of the SES project is not to create a pan-
European organisation, the monitoring of safety and the provision of 
efficient air navigation services has been left to individual Member 




The Service Provision Regulation is broken down into four chapters; 
dealing with general requirements, common requirements, charging 
schemes, and final provisions. 
National authorities shall supervise the application of the 
Regulation, through inspection and survey to ensure compliance and 
maintenance of safe and efficient air navigation services. This 
supervisory capacity arises out of the Framework Regulation which 
provides for clear delineation between regulatory bodies on the one 
hand and air navigation services on the other. 
Where FABs transcend national boundaries, national authorities 
shall conclude agreements between themselves as to how that 
particular block is supervised.39 
One of the principal aims of the Air Service Regulation is to create a 
system for certifying air navigation service providers, defining their 
rights and obligations to ensure overall compliance with the SES 
project.40 This entails that all services provided to general air traffic, 
be it meteorological, communication, surveillance, navigation and 
aeronautical must be certified by respective national authorities.41 A 
certificate may be issued to an air navigation service provider in 
respect of a single service offered or a bundle of services depending 
on their individual requirements. 
Certificates may only be issued to air navigation service providers 
on condition that certain common requirements, which are listed 
under Art.6 of the Regulation, are met.42 
In May 2004, the European Commission after some consultation 
produced a draft Regulation on common requirements. Following a 
further period of consultation, Regulation 2196/2005 came into force 
on December 20, 2005. This provision deals with the granting of 
certificates, derogations, and compliance.43 
The certification system is based on the premise of mutual 
recognition across Member States allowing for transnational 
provision of services and co-operation between service providers. 
The Regulation equips national authorities with the right to oversee 
and monitor compliance with common requirements; where there 
has been a failure to abide by the terms set out on the certificate, 
appropriate measures can be taken against the offending air 
navigation service provider including revocation of the certificate 
itself. 
The onus of proving compliance lies with the air navigation service 
provider for the duration of the validity of the certificate. However, 
to ensure compliance it is proposed to establish a regular system of 
inspection by the national authority; inspection can be carried out by 
personnel from the national authority or by a recognised 
organisation acting on their behalf.44 National authorities themselves 
will also be subject to ongoing peer review by a team comprising of 
experts from at least three different Member States, and the review 
shall cover all aspects of the common requirements listed in 
Regulation 550/2004. 
In addition to certification, the Service Air Regulation provides for 
the establishment of a scheme of common air navigation charges that 
will contribute to the achievement of greater transparency with 
respect to the determination, imposition and enforcement of charges 
to airspace users, in order to improve the overall ATM system's 
efficiency.45 
Currently, users pay for the different air navigation services. This 
applies whether they are on the ground or in mid-flight. Such 
services have traditionally been controlled by local monopolies; 
consequently, different charging schemes are in force across the 
Member States. Given the purpose of the SES project is the 
harmonisation of services, it follows that charges should be applied 
in a consistent and non-discriminatory manner across the 
community.46 Needless to say, the harmonisation of charges is 
dependent on system convergence envisaged within the meaning of 
the Interoperability Regulation; as to how quickly this takes place, is 
purely a matter of speculation.47 
 
 
The Airspace Regulation 
Whereas the Framework Regulation takes a structural approach to 
creating the Single European Sky, and the Air Service Regulation 
provides for standardisation of air navigation services, the Airspace 
Regulation takes a systemic approach, dealing with the organisation 
and use of airspace. In that regard it is fair to say that the Airspace 
Regulation from a functional perspective is arguably the most 
important of the legislative provisions introduced by the 
Commission in 2004.48 
At the heart of the Airspace Regulation is the flexible use of existing 
airspace and the necessity to optimise it during peak periods to 
promote overall efficiency and reduce sub-optimal use. In order to 
achieve these efficiencies the Regulation provides for 
reconfiguration of airspace based on operational requirements.49 The 
Regulation provides for the creation of the aforementioned FABs to 
be established by mutual agreement between Member States whose 
airspace is included within the proposed area.50 To date, however, 
none of these FABs have been created despite the fact the legislation 
was initiated almost two years ago.51 It is hoped that when the 
proposed FABs are up and running, this will result in the optimum 
use of air traffic routes, thus reducing delays and costs.52 However, 
airlines have been highly critical of the approach taken by the 
Commission in allowing Member States to create FABs, and would 
have preferred if a top-down approach had been taken instead.53 
Their criticisms centre on the belief that not all Member States are 
complying with the SES project.54 Recently the Commission 
criticised Greece for non-compliance in failing to create a national 
authority and provide for certification of air navigation services.55 
 
The Interoperability Regulation 
To create the systemic reorganisation of European airspace 
envisaged under the Airspace Regulation, it is necessary to develop 
and implement common technical specifications for the European 
Air Traffic Management Network (“EATMN”).56 Regulation 
552/2004 proposes the introduction of new systems and equipment 
that will enable interoperability, co-ordination and co-operation 
across the SES area.57 The Regulation proposes the creation of 
Community-wide specifications to ensure compliance; systems will 
be subject to verification by an air navigation service provider who 
must submit a declaration of compliance with the national 
supervisory authority.58 
 
Passenger rights and the SES Project 
The inevitable consequence of air traffic congestion results in 
delays, cancellations, and in some cases denied boardings where 
connections have not been met in a timely and efficient manner. The 
inefficiencies of the current system have impacted not only on air 
service providers, but more importantly on consumers. While it is 
not possible to blame all delays, cancellations and missed 
connections on air navigation service providers, the fragmented 
system in existence is a contributory factor. 
The SES project should theoretically reduce some of the 
unnecessary delays caused to passengers and airlines arising out of 
inefficient use of airspace. However, critics of Regulation 261/2004 
have a fair point when they say they will be penalised for delays 
over which they may have no control, such as air traffic congestion, 
adverse weather, industrial action, safety concerns, and the 
behaviour of passengers themselves. 
Indeed, it is fair to say that a modified version of the Regulation 
could have been introduced pending the completion of the SES 
project. Nevertheless, the Regulation does not preclude operating air 
carriers from seeking compensation from any person or third party in 
situations where the delay or cancellation is caused by extraordinary 
circumstances beyond the airlines control.59 
In the case of The I.A.T.A. and ors v The Department of Transport, 
the High Court referred eight questions to the Court of Justice for a 
preliminary ruling.60 
Principal among the questions asked was whether Art.6 of 
Regulation 261/2004 conflicted with certain provisions under the 
Montreal Convention?61 The Court noted that a delay arising out of 
air carriage caused two kinds of damage: 
“First, excessive delay will cause damage that is almost identical for 
every passenger, redress for which may take the form of 
standardised and immediate assistance or care for everybody 
concerned, through the provision, for example, of refreshments, 
meals and accommodation and of the opportunity to make telephone 
calls. Second, passengers are liable to suffer individual damage, 
inherent in the reason for travelling, redress for which requires a 
case-by-case assessment of the extent of the damage caused and can 
consequently only be the subject of compensation granted 
subsequently on an individual basis.”62 
The Court was of the view that the Convention merely governs 
conditions under which a flight is delayed, and where individual 
passengers may initiate proceedings for damages.63 Furthermore, 
there was nothing within the Convention which could preclude any 
other form of intervention by public authorities for the purposes of 
redress for damages caused by delay. The Court emphasised that 
Art.6 was not inconsistent with the provisions set out in the Montreal 
Convention.64 
“The Montreal Convention could not therefore prevent the action 
taken by the Community legislature to lay down, in exercise of the 
powers conferred on the Community in the fields of transport and 
consumer protection, the conditions under which damage linked to 
the abovementioned inconvenience should be redressed. Since the 
assistance and taking care of passengers envisaged by Article 6 of 
Regulation No 261/2004 in the event of a long delay to a flight 
constitute such standardised and immediate compensatory measures, 
they are not among those whose institution is regulated by the 
Convention. The system prescribed in Article 6 simply operates at 
an earlier stage than the system which results from the Montreal 
Convention.” 
The Court concluded that the standardised measures provided for 
under Art.6 do not prevent passengers from bringing an action for 
damages arising out of delay under the provisions of the Montreal 
Convention. 
This of course necessitates the criticism that whereas the SES project 
aims to reduce congestion and delay, any cost saving to the airline 
operators may be lost by the application of Art.6 where non-
systemic delays such as meteorological conditions or industrial 
action cause delay. 
 
Micro-managing the SES project in Ireland and the UK 
The Irish Aviation Authority, which is the designated national 
authority in Ireland, controls one of the most important airspace 
blocks in the world, namely the European and North Atlantic 
interface.65 The IAA and its UK counterpart, the National Air Traffic 
Service (“NATS”), are currently examining proposals for the 
creation of a joint UK and Irish FAB.66 A high level study was 
initiated in 2005 and a report was published in June 2005.67 The 
purpose of the study was to examine all areas associated with the 
establishment of a functional airspace block, from operational to 
regulatory. According to the report, the focus of the study was to 
establish whether there was a prima facie case for establishing a 
FAB.68 The report sought to address a number of key issues, 
principal among which is why the UK and Ireland should consider 
creating a joint FAB? The rationale for establishing a joint UK and 
Irish FAB is outlined in the report, in so far that: 
 . 1. Both countries share a long common geographical boundary. 
 . 2. There is a long history of operational co-operation. 
 . 3. NATS and the IAA have a shared need to manage North 
Atlantic traffic. 
 . 4. There is a significant degree of overlap between customers. 
 . 5. There is a history of intergovernmental and regulatory co-
operation. 
 . 6. There are strong institutional similarities between the two. 
 . 7. Both ANSPs have a similar commercial orientation. 
 . 8. Common language and shared cultural ties. 
Taking those factors into consideration, the report writers suggest 
that the UK and Ireland form the ideal partnership for the creation of 
the first of Europe's FABs.69 
 
Consultation process 
In researching their report, civil and military airspace users were 
consulted. Various issues were raised by both groups. Civil 
operators were anxious that any benefits arising out of the joint 
UK/Ireland FAB are passed onto them; in particular they are hopeful 
that there will be fewer flight restrictions caused by military use of 
airspace. One of the particular concerns for civil airspace users are 
the restrictions imposed by virtue of the North Wales Military 
Training Area (MTA). The lack of availability of this area has 
traditionally placed restrictions on air traffic between the UK and 
Ireland resulting in route diversions. According to the report, the UK 
military authorities have proposed to make this area more freely 
available to civil aviation in the future, however it has been indicated 
that the airspace will be sequestered at short notice, thus negating 
any attempts to schedule traffic through this area on an ongoing 
basis.70 
From a practical perspective, the report notes that whereas the 
Airspace Regulation only provides for the creation of a FAB in 
upper airspace, the general consensus among ANSPs is that this 
should be broadened to include lower airspace as well. Furthermore, 
the report recommends including a sizeable area of airspace known 
as the Shanwick Oceanic Control Area (“OCA”) which is 
technically outside the European Flight Information Region 
(“FIR”).71 The report recommends that the proposed FAB should 
include the territorial airspace of both countries together with the 
Shanwick OCA, an area comprising of 3.4 million km. 
 
 
Benefits of the proposed UK/Irish FAB 
The report identified a number of areas where quantitative and 
qualitative benefits would accrue to service providers and users. The 
likely benefits considered are both short-term and long-term.72 A 
summary of the likely short and long term benefits listed in the 
report are reproduced below73 : 
 . • service quality improvements; 
 . • lower staff overheads; 
 . • joint procurement and maintenance; 
 . • reduced operating costs; and 
 . • greater access to military airspace. 
In terms of service quality benefits, the report notes that flight 
efficiencies are by no means guaranteed. This of course begs the 
question, if flight efficiencies are not guaranteed, then what is the 
purpose of creating a FAB? However the report estimates that 
approximately 2,000-4,000 flight hours would be saved annually in 
Irish airspace alone with an approximate cost saving somewhere in 
the region of €10-20 million per annum.74 
The cost of implementing a joint UK/Irish FAB is estimated in the 
region of €10-15 million, almost equivalent to the estimated flight 
hour savings listed above. The report doesn't calculate the annual 
operation costs associated with the proposed FAB. 
  
Regulatory issues 
The report concludes with the regulatory steps to be taken to make 
the proposed FAB a reality; this invariably requires further 
engagement between the governments, the regulatory agencies, and 
the service providers.75 The major recommendations are summarised 
as follows76 : 
 . 1. The British and Irish governments should notify the commission 
of their intention to create a FAB.77  
 . 2. The UK government should review whether any legislative 
changes are necessary. 
 . 3. The Irish government should introduce legislation to reform the 
structure of the IAA, so that there are no legal impediments to 
joint collaboration with NATs. 
 . 4. The regulators should agree to jointly designate both service 
providers in their national airspace. 
 . 5. They should agree a regulatory framework for the 
implementation of common regulatory principles and draw up 
a timetable for implementation. 
 . 6. In terms of the Charging Directive, both national authorities 
should make joint proposals for economic regulation in a 
situation where each of the two ANSPs is responsible for 
providing services in the airspace covered by each regulator. 
 . 7. Consideration should be given by both governments and 
regulators to the steps necessary for the development of joint 




This article has sought to critically evaluate the SES project from a 
macro and micro perspective, asking an important question, namely, 
what is the opportunity of cost of the project to airlines, air service 
navigation providers, passengers and to the community at large? The 
annual cost of European air traffic management is €7 billion per 
annum. Airlines hope that the creation of the SES project will reduce 
ATM operation costs by as much as 30 per cent. Skeptics point out 
that whereas the Commission has provided a framework for the SES, 
the bottom-up approach will only delay the project unnecessarily. In 
order to test this belief, this article has evaluated the advances made 
by the UK/Ireland in creating a FAB to cover their joint airspace. 
Whereas significant steps have been made in this particular area, 
advances have been slow in the Community in general with one 
Member State failing to create a national authority as requested 
under the legislative framework. 
Furthermore, critics point out that the economic benefits of creating 
FABs will not be large initially, but will take time to generate major 
cost savings and efficiencies. Indeed, it has been demonstrated 
above, that the initial cost of creating the joint UK/Ireland FAB 
corresponds with the annual cost to Irish aviation of lost flying hours 
which is somewhere in the region of €10-20 million. However, what 
the report fails to address is the very real possibility that the 
restructuring process in the short to medium term may at least 
contribute to greater delay as different Member States attempt to 
converge incompatible systems and introduce new technologies. 
Moreover, many of the elementary economic issues still need to be 
resolved, principal among which is the process of reaching 
agreement on single en-route charges for each FAB. It is in this area 
that most ANSPs generate a large proportion of their income, and is 
likely to prove the greatest bureaucratic hurdle to the expeditious 
completion of the SES project. 
But where does this leave air service providers and more importantly 
the passengers, the very users who the SES project is ultimately 
designed to facilitate? From a passenger's perspective the SES 
project should theoretically reduce flight delays and cancellations 
caused by congestion, and systemic factors.78 However, no amount 
of regulation can legislate for non-systemic factors such as adverse 
meteorological conditions, industrial action, passenger disturbance, 
and indeed acts of terrorism. 
Although passengers are likely to be the long term beneficiaries 
from the SES project it is by no means certain that air service 
providers will accrue the same. The introduction of the Delayed 
Flight Regulation is likely to adversely affect the airlines 
disproportionately in the short term, particularly budget carriers 
whose no frills service operates on the principle of slim profit 
margins. 
In the meantime, airline operators are concerned that the cost burden 
of complying with Regulation 261/2004 will affect their 
profitability, and inevitably drive up the price of airfares for 
passengers. Perhaps there is some merit in the argument that the 
introduction of this later Regulation should have been delayed until 
such time as the SES project and FABs in particular become a 
reality. 
Those arguments aside, the SES project is an ambitious attempt to 
streamline the European aviation network and reduce the inordinate 
and inexcusable delays associated with congested and fragmented 
airspace. As to whether it achieves its lauded objectives is purely a 
matter of speculation. What will be interesting to analyse is whether 
the development of the project from the ground up will succeed or 
whether at some later date the Commission will have to intervene 
and direct the implementation from the top down. Perhaps and only 
time will tell, whether the true opportunity cost of the SES project is 
that the Commission should have taken a top-down approach from 
the beginning. 
 * 
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 1 
 [ Case C—344/04 International Air Transport Association and 
others v The Department of Transport [2006] E.C.R. The 
International Air Transport Association (“IATA”) was founded in 
Havana in 1945 and represents 270 members from more than 140 
Nations. The European Low Fares Airline Association (“ELFAA”) 
was founded in 2003 as an unincorporated association representing 
10 airlines from nine countries. ] 
 2 
 [ Despite reduced delays to European air traffic, in 2003 it was 
estimated that 14.8 million minutes were lost to ATM delays. The 
Single European Sky — Implementing Political Commitments (The 
European Commission, Directorate General for Energy and 
Transport, Brussels, 2004), p.1. ] 
 3 
 [ The cost of delays to airlines often exceeds the price paid for en-
route services. ] 
 4 
 [ Hereinafter referred to as the SES project. ] 
 5 
 [ The European Commission estimated that air transport demand 
grew by 5-7 per cent up to 2000, leading to a doubling of air traffic 
every 12 years. In 1999, the Commission estimated that 
approximately 21 per cent of all flights were delayed with an 
average delay of 25 minutes. European Commission Directorate-
General for Energy and Transport, “Single European Sky” Report 
of the High Level Group, November 2000. Some 8.5 million civil 
flights were recorded in European Airspace during 2003 which 
amounted to 26,000 flights per day. The Single European Sky — 
Implementing Political Commitments. The European Commission, 
Directorate General for Energy and Transport (Brussels) 2004 ] 
 6 
 [ Eurocontrol estimates that air traffic will continue to grow at 
approximately 3.7 per cent per annum for the whole of Europe 
between 2005-2011. “A vision for European Aviation” Eurocontrol 
and ACI Europe Press Conference. Aguado, Victor M. Director 
General of Eurocontrol ] 
 7 
 [ The European ATM network is operated by a multitude of 
National ATM centres that are responsible for controlling air traffic 
in their airspace. ] 
 8 
 [ In 1997, the EU introduced an open market for air transport 
services. Arising out of this, airlines lines licensed by the regulatory 
authorities of the Member States are free to operate between 
different points within the EU. However, despite the deregulation of 
the ATS Air Transport Control (“ATC”), services are still largely 
organised according to national boundaries. ] 
 9 
 [ Civilian aircraft in traveling from one destination to another 
often circumnavigate large areas of airspace which is reserved for 
military aircraft. Consequently, a flight from Rome to Amsterdam 
will have to change course on several occasions during the flight 
rather than fly in a straight line from point of departure to point of 
arrival. ] 
 10 
 [ Inefficient use of airspace is by no means the only reason for 
delay. Operational difficulties often arise owing to incompatibility of 
control systems, and staff shortages. In its High Level Group Report 
the Commission noted in 2000, that there was a shortfall in the 
number of Air Traffic Controllers (ATCs) currently operating across 
the EC. ] 
 11 
 [ Single European Sky; Report of the High-Level Group. 
European Commission (Brussels) November 2000. The High Level 
Group was established at the behest of EU Transport Commissioner, 
Loyola de Palacio, and comprised representatives from both civilian 
and military authorities of the Member States together with 
representatives from Switzerland and Norway. The Commission 
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can only be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of 
liability as are set out in this Convention without prejudice to the 
question as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit 
and what are their respective rights. In any such action, punitive, 
exemplary or any other non-compensatory damages shall not be 
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